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AIRLINE EMPLOYEE SLOWDOWNS AND SICKOUTS AS UNLAWFUL SELF HELP:
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Wm. Francis Herlehy ill, Ph.D. and Tracy Ingalls-Ashbaugh
ABSTRACf
Labor relations literature and numerous trade journals are replete with stories of labor
slowdowns and sickouts. The consequences of this usually illegal activity are minimal because
of the difficulty, ifnot impossibility, ofproving a concerted effort. The authors suggest a means
by which "slowdown" activity as a matter of chance can be ruled out. Further research
suggestions are offered.
INTRODUCfION
Aviation collective bargaining has been
widely employed and severely tested in
recent years as the industry has felt the
strain of foreign competition, deregulation
and intense intra-industry competition. In
the airline sector of the industry, these
factors along with declining traffic and
skyrocketing fuel costs have led to chaotic
and bitter labor/management relations.
Although the airline industry has been
marked by several turbulent collective
bargaining situations since deregulation,
work stoppage activity in the past decade
has declined. Once a potent economic tool
for airline laborers, the strike has not been
particularly effective in recent years.
Decreased Use of Strikes
Many factors contribute to the decreasing
use of strikes. A sluggish economy bred
laborers' financial concerns and allowed for
a plentiful pool of replacements. Often
there are incentives, such as enhancing
seniority, to individuals who cross picket
lines. "The government's firing of 11,000
striking air traffic controllers in 1981 set a
tone of at least implicit government
approval ofaggressive management response
to union strikes" (McDonald & Asher, 1989,
p. 350). An overall diminished support for
unions has affected both the number of
employees willing to honor a strike and a
strike's ability to generate public support.
The public is not inclined to sympathize
18
with any union, especially pilots. "When it
comes to strikes, the actions usually revolve
around the pilots because they can shut
down an airline so convincingly" (Fotos,
1990, pp. 56-57). Most airline unions need
the support of the pilots for an effective
shut down of the carrier, but greater
numbers of union members are refusing to
honor their colleagues' picket lines. Further-
more, for a pilot strike to be successful
pilots must not be quickly replaced and, if
they are, the public must sympathize and
refuse to fly the "struck" airline. According
to Aviation Week & Space Technology,
however, "Pilots have a hard time getting
sympathy. The public image of pilots consists
of $100,000 salaries given to people who
don't work very many hours a week" (Fotos,
1990, pp. 56-57). The great publicity given
to the recent contract agreement between
Delta Airlines and its pilot's union, which
gave captains of wide-bodied jumbo jets
$176,130 after 12 years, is an example of the
influences on the ticket paying public
regarding pilots' "glamorous assignments"
and high salaries (Hayes, 1991).
In Collective Bargaining: A Union
Perspective, the Air Line Pilots Association's
Director of Representation has stated that
the strike is "no longer an effective
bargaining tool," which has resulted in "a
profoundly altered balance of power in the
collective bargaining process" (Rosen, 1988,
pp. 11, 15). Therefore, since the effective-
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ness of the strike is highly questionable,
unions have begun to employ alternative
methods of self help. Among these methods
of instituting governmental pressure, the
"corporate campaign" including advertising,
work slowdowns, and employee sickouts.
Alternative Methods of Self Help
By exposing alleged circumstances of
mismanagement to the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), unions have
attempted to gain leverage by putting
governmental pressure on specific carriers.
Labor's challenge before the DOT of
TWA's fitness to operate, and its
assault on Eastern before Congress,
the FAA, and a specially formed
Citizens Commission of Inquiry into
Texas Air Corp. are recent examples.
(McDonald & Asher, 1989, p. 354).
This method of self help requires
considerable time and financial resources
and its effectiveness is of yet uncertain.
The corporate campaign involves a
dramatic presentation to the public, frequent
flyers, travel agents, stockholders, and
lenders exposing the alleged unbalance of
the bargaining positions. It often involves
contacting travel agents to encourage them
to book their clients on other airlines,
calling into question the safety practices of
the airline, and staging demonstrations and
rallies at hub airports. The union also has
used campaigning in the form of radio and
television advertisements aimed at improving
its image and influence with the public.
"While such campaigns are generally
considered to be lawful, they require careful
planning and substantial resources in order
to be successful, and even then the 'success'
of such a campaign is difficult to measure"
(McDonald & Asher, 1989, p. 354).
According to McDonald and Asher (1989),
JAAER, Winter 1993
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the unions' principal remaInIng tools of
economic pressure are work slowdowns and
employee sickouts. When instigated by a
sufficient number of members, these tactics
can significantly disrupt a carrier's on-time
performance and even cause flight
cancellations. The resulting loss of revenue,
poor customer seIVice and tarnished public
image can be successful in gaining unions
economic bargaining power. "The genesis of
such actions is difficult to detect, and they
often may be masked in a professed concern
for safety" (McDonald & Asher, 1989, p.
355).
Statement of the Problem
Unions members are forbidden from work
slowdowns and sickouts under the Railway
Labor Act of 1936. The law, which applies
to airlines and their labor groups, requires a
prolonged series of actions before airline
unions can act outside negotiations. Union
inspired job actions, however, are difficult to
prove. Knowing that injunctions may be
granted to halt these forms of economic
pressure, union leaders are cautious not to
expose any direct evidence and are prepared
with myriad denials and alternative
explanations. "As unions have become more
sophisticated over the years, the likelihood
that they will leave many 'smoking guns' for
the carrier to seize cpon as direct evidence
to support an injunction has decreased"
(McDonald & Asher, 1989, pp. 355-356).
Thus, the difficult task of proving union
responsibility for work slowdowns and
employee sickouts falls upon the airline
carrier.
Statistical analysis, however, provides a
means by which carriers may defend their
accusations. The methods of analysis,
descnbed in McDonald and "Asher's (1989)
article will determine whether slowdowns
and sickouts occurred strictly by chance or if
19
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it can be inferred they were union
organized. The inference can be supported
by demonstrating that the chances a
particular job action occurred purely by
chance are unusually high. Statistics showing
measure of relationship are also effective for
determining whether job actions were union
organized. Union responsibility for
slowdowns can be inferred when periods of
"negotiation" and periods of "no negotiation"
show significantly different occurrences of
job actions. According to McDonald and
Asher (1989), such a showing provides a
powerful repudiation of union officials
denial of responsibility and should establish
at least a prima facie case of union
orchestration (McDonald & Asher, 1989).
Statement of the Purpose
In this research project, the authors will
first define and discuss work slowdowns and
employee sickouts. Second, the actions of
American Airlines management and its
pilot's union, the Allied Pilots Association,
during their contract negotiation period
from January 1990 through January 1991
will be presented. Third, the Railway Labor
Act, which prohibits slowdowns and sickouts,
will be examined. Finally, statistical analyses
will be applied to the American Airlines
example. The null hypothesis to be tested is
that no relationship exists between the
negotiation period and the on-time
performance record of the airline.
REVIEW OF SLOWDOWNS
AND SICKOUTS
"Industrial guerilla warfare-in the form of
work slowdowns and employee sickouts-has
staged a comeback in recent times,
particularly in the airline industry"
(McDonald & Asher, 1989, p. 356). As the
strike has become a less effective economic
tool against airline management, the unions
have turned to purposefully creating
20
interruptions in their daily responsibilities.
Examples of these slowdowns, or insider
retaliations, are Northwest baggage handlers
misrouting bags, and American flight
attendants leisurely distributing food trays
and reporting safety violations to the FAA
(Conway, 1988).
One slowdown technique immensely
effective for pilots is "work to rule." Because
of the enormous decision making power
pilots have over whether an aircraft is fit to
fly, their means of slowing down a departure
or even canceling a flight are virtually
endless. Checklists are performed to the
letter and minor repairs are insisted upon
rather than overlooked or postponed to the
end of the day. Pilots may even take the
slowdowns one step further by creating the
need for repair themselves or by not
identifying the need until arriving at a
station where the airline does not employ
maintenance personnel. Thus, the pilot costs
the airline time and money to bring in
another carrier's maintenance workers. Most
important, however, is that accusations from
management of slowdown job actions are
refuted by insistence that workers are
protecting passenger safety.
Another slowdown tactic involves manipu-
lating flight operations so as to intentionally
arrive more than 15 minutes late. In
compiling statistics of on-time performance
records for the airlines, the DOT considers
arrivals to be on time if they are not more
than 15 minutes late. Thus, iorcing arrivals
to be 16 minutes or more later than the
published time adversely affects a carrier's
performance rating.
Among the many methods used to delay
flights is to follow Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs) and air .carrier
operations manuals exactly. "For example,
pilots may insist on instrument approaches
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in clear weather or on repeating verbatim all
air traffic controller instructions" (McDonald
& Asher, 1989, p. 358). Simpler means of
achieving the 16 minute late arrival include
taxiing slowly, ordering elaborate
maintenance checks, and slowing the speed
of the aircraft by carrying too much fuel
(United Air's, 1989). To add greater expense
to their tardiness tactics, pilots also start all
three engines immediately rather than just
one which is ordinarily used until takeoff.
The slowdown is an effective negotiation
tool for unions because it produces real
and/or potential economic pressure. Burning
excessive amounts of fuel and requiring
additional maintenance become immediate
costs to the airline. Carriers also lose
revenue instantly when cancellations force
them to accommodate travelers on
competing airlines. The delaying and
canceling of flights, along with passengers
becoming victims of job slowdowns, could
potentially produce loss of market share by
travelers taking their business to other
carriers. Disciplining the offenders and
seeking injunctive relief are virtually the
carrier's only options. Discipline cannot be
enforced, however, if the action was solely
following procedures to the letter. Without
proof of union responsibility, injunctive
relief is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain
(McDonald & Asher, 1989).
"A sickout, if sufficiently widespread, can
cause the same magnitude of disruption to
service as can a slowdown, with flights being
delayed or canceled for lack of crews"
(McDonald & Asher, 1989, p.360). Although
organized sickouts are more obvious than
work slowdowns, they are just as difficult to
prove. Plans are passed by word of mouth,
leaving no direct evidence, and often
medical reports are provided for use as
possible explanations.
JAAER, Winter 1993
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REVIEW OF THE STUDY SAMPLE:
AMERICAN AIRLINES
In July of 1991 Business Week author,
Wendy Zellner, wrote:
Already, some disgruntled pilots seem
to be delaying flights be working
strictly by the book, helping push
American into the No. 9 spot on the
Transportation Dept.'s list of on-time
performance for airlines in March and
April. The company was No. 7 in
February and No.2 in the last quarter
of 1989. (Zellner, 1990, p. 33)
American Airline's five year pilot contract
expired in December 1989. Contract talks,
however, began the previous October with
the hopes of meeting a self imposed
negotiation deadline in January 1990. As the
deadline approached, management and the
pilots' union, the Allied Pilots Association,
were too far apart, and talks broke down. In
July 1990, talks resumed in Miami under the
direction of a federal mediator, Harry
Bickford. No agreement was reached from
those talks, and Bickford was quoted as
saying "this is a classic labor dispute"
(Zellner, 1990, p. 33).
A fundamental disagreement on the
airline's long term profitability, with pilots
holding a more optimistic view than
management, continued to prolong the
negotiations and inv:te job actions (Fotos,
1990). Pilots wanted significantly improved
benefits and wages, including a shorter time
on the lower wage tier. The company would
not offer the rates equivalent to Delta that
the pilots were demanding. Zellner stated
there was "growing militancy among the
union's board members" and that directors
wanted "a tougher negotiating stance"
(Zellner, 1990, p. 33). Evidence of job
actions to gain union bargaining power
began surfacing as negotiations were drawn
21
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out. An APA leader, Dana R. MacKimmie,
was quoted as saying "I think (Crandall)
knows in a service industry that you have to
address the concerns of the employees"
(Zellner, 1990, p. 33).
On November 5, 1990, American's
President, Robert Crandall, sent a letter to
the APA's President, Fred Vogel, charging
the union with instigating a job slowdown.
"Crandall wrote, 'Some members of the
association, with active support of APA
representatives, have for many months been
engaged in slowdown activities designed to
damage the company's operations'" (Fotos,
1990, pp. 36-37). The union replied by
denying the allegations and stating that
disgruntled individuals were likely acting on
their own. Amid the growIng unrest,
American made a contract proposal to the
union which was instantly rejected. Robert
w. Baker, American's executive vice
president of operations, responded by
sending out a letter to all 8800 pilots stating,
'''You might as well understand, guys, you're
not going to get Delta rates'" (O'Brian,
1991, p. cI3).
A B-scale pilot, who asked not to be
identified, was quoted by O'Brian (1991, p.
c13) as saying "The mood (among pilots)
shifted after that. Now nobody is happy with
the company." Aviation Week & Space
Technology reported that later in the week
anonymous computer generated messages
appeared on bulletin boards in American's
flight rooms with messages like "Coming
soon to an airport near you--gridlock! (The
Crandall Crawl) Nov 21-23" (Fotos, 1990,
pp.36-37).
American was already fighting the apparent
slowdown, and as the contract dispute
continued, the union allegedly called for a
sickout. On December 23 at DallaslFt.
Worth Airport the carrier canceled 74
22
flights (about 9% of its fligllts), due to an
increase in the number of pilots calling in
sick (Solomon, 1990). Travel Weekly writer,
Rik Fairlie (1991), reported the holiday
sickout as follows:
As of early January, American said
the number of its pilots calling in sick
hovered just below 400 per day, which
is approximately 35% above normal.
'During the peak holiday travel
periods,' the spokesman said, 'an
average of 525 pilots called in sick per
day, or 70% above normal,
inconveniencing some 60,000
passengers.' (Fairlie, 1991, p. 4)
The union claimed the airli~ewas unfairly
blaming members for cancellations caused by
bad weather, winter illness and pilots in
active reserve duty for Operation Desert
Shield.
American received a temporary restraining
order on December 26, from U.S. District
Court Judge, John McBryde, barring the
APA from organizing or encouraging
activities aimed at disrupting the carrier's
operations. The airline alleged the union
had been waging illegal job'actions.
In his order, Judge McBryde said that
he granted the request because the
airline 'is likely to prevail on the
merits of its claims' and that the
'disruptive activity' col,ld 'cause
American Airlines to .suffer a
substantial loss of revenue and
passenger goodwill which it can never
recover.' (Solomon, 1990, p. A3)
The restraining order required the union to
notify its members to refrain from taking
part in any mass sickout, slowdown, or other
actions to disrupt the airline's operations.
Aviation Week & Space Technology reported,
however, that:
Despite this (the restraining order)
JAAER, Winter 1993
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airline officials said, the number of
pilots calling in ill each day continued
to range between 500 and 525
through Dec. 31. During the first two
days of January, the number calling in
ill dropped to about 400, still well
above normal, the officials said. Other
disruptive actions continue to be
encountered .... including reports of
nonexistent mechanical malfunctions,
and other minor actions. (Brown,
1991, p. 37)
On January 2, and for several consecutive
days, American engaged in campaigning of
its own. The company placed advertisements
in 23 major newspapers apologizing for
delays and cancellations during the holidays,
and blaming the disruptions on the pilot's
illegal job actions. The union responded
with alternative explanations such as over
scheduling, widespread influenza, and pilots
lost to Operation Desert Shield. According
to The Wall Street Journal:
The union also released a letter its
president, Fred Vogel, wrote to the
FAA alleging American's ground
crews make frequent mistakes when
figuring the weight of departing
aircraft. Such errors, the union
claimed, 'demonstrate a growing loss
of safety and increasing numbers of
flights where the public has been
endangered.' (O'Brian, 1991, c13)
Also on January 2, American announced it
would reduce flights by 4% to compensate
for crews calling in sick. Three days later,
flight reductions were increased to 11%.
"We cannot chance another situation like
. . . . the recent holiday." said Robert W.
Baker, an American executive vice president
in explaining the 11% cut. The unions
refuted by declaring there was over capacity
in the industry and that pilots were not as
JAAER, Winter 1993
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badly needed during this period because air
travel was down considerably, the economy
was poor, and the war was driving up fuel
costs (O'Brian, 1991).
Negotiations resumed in Washington on
January 7, 1991 before federal mediators.
An impasse appeared inescapable on
January 31 when American presented its
final offer and the ALPA refused to take it
to its membership. On February 9 after an
all-night session an agreement was made to
enter into binding arbitration.
SLOWDOWNS AND SICKOUTS
AS UNLAWFUL SELF HELP
Although American's pilots had been
working without a contract since December
30, 1989, they were' forbidden from work
slowdowns, strikes and other actions under
the Railway Labor Act. The act requires air
carriers and their employees, in the process
of contract negotiations, to follow
mandatory resolution procedures. First, if
the two sides cannot agree, either party can
petition for a federally appointed mediator.
In the example, when American and the
APA did not resolve their differences by
their self-appointed deadline, Harry Bickford
of the National Mediation Board was called
in. If the two sides still cannot agree, the
mediator can declare them to be at an
impasse and enter a thirty day cooling off
period. "Through this entire process,
including the thirty-day cooling off period,
'neither party may unilaterally alter the
status quo'" (McDonald & Asher, 1989, pp.
361-62). H the entire period ends without a
new contract, the union is free to strike and
the company is able to impose any work
rules and pay it chooses.
The Railway Labor Act's status quo
provision prohibits work slowdown and
employee sickouts during the entire contract
negotiation period. The status quo is
23
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intended to maintain working conditions
existing before the dispute arose, including
labor practices not specifically included in
the collective bargaining agreement. The
tactics of American Airline's employees to
disrupt operations, were in violation of the
status quo, and the means for relief, an
injunction, was sought.
In order to win an injunction, the court
must find evidence of disruption of the
status quo, concerted action (or inaction) on
the part of union members, and financial
harm to the carrier. Financial harm is often
in the form of the loss of customer goodwill.
In American's case, Judge McBryde found
that management's claims were reasonable,
there was evidence of disruption of
operations, and American had suffered
irreparable loss. Although the union may
not have been proven to be directly
responsible for the disruption, McDonald
and Asher (1989) point out in their cited
article two methods, other than direct
evidence, where courts may find union
responsibility. The first is that both parties
have a duty to settle disputes without
interrupting service, and any union official's
inaction to take serious measures to stop job
actions is in violation. The second is the
mass action theory, which justifies union
responsibility. by asserting that large scale
slowdowns or sickouts do not just happen
without organization.
ANALYSIS OF THE SAMPLE
Subjects
The data to be used are the overall
percentages of reported flight operations
arriving on time for American Airlines as
reported to the DOT. Airlines are required
by 14 CFR Part 234 of DOT's regulations to
file the information with the DOT each
month. Data is reported for nonstop
scheduled time shown in the carriers'
24
Computerized Reservations Systems (U.8..
Department of Transportation, 1991). Time
periods of the data to be used for analysis
are: September 1987 to January 1988,
September 1988 to January 1989, September
1989 to January 1990, and September 1990
through January, 1991. See Table 1 for data
to be analyzed.
TABLE 1
DATA TABLE
American Airlines
Flight Operations Arriving on Time
(percentage)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
SEP 85.20 85.60 84.60 -82.30
OCT 86.10 86.80 85.80 81.30
NOV 83.20 82.70 83.50 80.70
DEC 78.10 78.60 76.10 65.20
JAN 79.70 79.40 80.30 64.30
Source:. u.s. DepIl11me1U ofTransportlJlion. Consumer Affairs
Office. Air Travel Consumer Report Washington: GPO, 1987-
1991.
Sample selection is based upon alleged
slowdowns occurring during the contract
negotiation period July 1990 to January
1991. The September to January time period
is used because data for July and August
1987 are unobtainable. The years 1987,1988,
and 1989 are used for control.
Instruments
The statistical measurements to be
calculated include; two measures of central
tendency, a measure of variability, and a
measure of relationship. The two measures
of central tendency to be calculated· are the
median and the mean. These measures of
central tendency were chosen to represent
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TABLE 2
The Pearson r was calculated based on
Source: u.s. Department of Transportation. Consumer
Affairs Office. Air Travel Consumer Report. Washington:
GPO, 1987-1991.
DATA TABLE
American Airlines
Flight Operations Arriving on Time
(percentages)
Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation
3.46 3.64 3.91 9.16
1987 1988 1989 1990
83.2 82.7 83.5 80.7
82.46 82.62 82.06 74.76
STANDARD
DEVIATION
MEDIAN
MEAN
observed to see whether they support the
graphic conclusion. If ~ significant difference
appears probable, the Pearson r test for
relationship is calculated.
The on-time performance during the con-
trol years is measured against one another
to determine if a relationship exists. The on-
time performance will then be measured
against the on-time performance during the
negotiation period, 1990, to determine
whether a relationship exists.
RESULTS
The means and standard deviations
appeared to support this conclusion because
the mean on-time performance during 1990
was lower than those of the control years,
and the standard deviation for 1990 showed
a large variance. The large variance
indicated that there were months that
significantly differed from the mean on-time
percentage. (See Table 2.)
the typical percentage of on-time
performance for each time period.
Individual months during those periods will
then be observed for variance. The standard
deviation is used as the measure of vari-
ability because it is the most stable measure
of variability and takes into account each
and every score. It will indicate whether the
on-time performance percentages during a
time period are relatively close to one
another or whether they are spread out
(large variance). Use of the mean and the
standard deviation provide a relatively clear
picture of the distribution of the on-time
percentages for each period. The measure
of relationship to be used is the Pearson r.
The Pearson r was chosen because it takes
into account each and every score in both
distributions, and it is the most stable
measure of correlation. The Pearson r
measure of relationship, or correlational
measure, is used to determine if, and to
what degree, a relationship exists between
the on-time performance during the periods
of no negotiations and the on-time perform-
ance during the period of negotiations. The
level of significance to be used is .01.
Design
The measures of central tendency and
variance are observed to determine whether
it is feasible that a significant difference
exists between the negotiation period,
September 1990 to January 1991, and the
control periods. Because the negotiation
period in 1990 carried through January of
1991, January of each year is included in the
previous year. For example, the time period
from September 1990 to January 1991 is
presented as September-January 1990, or
may simply be presented as January in the
year 1990. This is done in order to simplify
the information and analysis. The mean,
median and standard deviation will then be
JAAER, Winter 1993 25
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TABLE 3
Years Result (r) Conclusion
Source:. U.S. Department of Transportation. Consumer
Affairs Office. Air Travel Consumer Report. Washington:
GPO, 1987-1991.
DATA TABLE
American Airlines
Flight Operations Arriving on Time
(percentages)
Measure of Relationship-Pearson r
during 1990. (See Table 3.)
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected
because not only was there a statistically
significant relationship between each pairing
of the control years, but in addition no
statistically significant relationship was
shown between anyone of the control years
and the negotiation period, 1990.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The results of the analysis warrant rejecting
the hypothesis. There is a statistically
significant relationship between the
negotiation period and the on-time
performance record of the airline.
The differences observed, the means and
standard deviations, are probably the result
of organized slowdown activity sufficient
enough to cause a significant difference
between the year they occurred and
previous years.
The results of this analysis clearly indicate
that a statistically significant relationship
exists between a period of contract
negotiations and employee slowdowns or
sickouts.
Establishing a statistically significant
relationship between negotiations and
slowdowns could have used different
measures of slowdowns. The same statistical
procedures used in this study could have
been followed using (a) the number of
sickouts, (b) the number of flight
cancellations, or (c) the number of
maintenance reports submitted by pilots and
the same time periods.
Further research, likely necessary to obtain
an injunction, would need to include addi-
tional control data such as flights by airport
and a comparison of on-time performance
by month to that of other comparable air
carriers.
The important fact for airline managers is
that statistical procedures are available to
level of significance = .01
significant relationship
significant relationship
not significant
significant relationship
not significant
not significant
.9901
.9695
.9414
.9656
.9185
.8903
findings thus far. For the hypothesis to be
rejected, indicating that a statistically
significant relationship does exist between
the negotiation period and the on-time
performance of the airline, a statistically
significant relationship would have to be
found between the on-time performance of
each pairing of the control years, and no
statistically significant relationship could be
found between the on-time performance of
any of the control years and the negotiation
period.
degrees of freedom =3
1987 to 1988
1987 to 1989
1987 to 1990
1988 to 1989
1988 to 1990
1989 to 1990
The Pearson r, measure of relationship,
indicates that a statistically significant
relationship does exist between the on-time
performance of each pairing of the control
years and that a statistically significant
relationship could not be shown between
the on-time performance for any of the
control years and the on-time performance
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assist in providing reasonable proof of union
Airline Employee Slowdowns and Sickouts
responsibility for illegal job actions.[]
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APPENDIX A
MEAN = Ex
N
STANDARD
=
DEV1A770N
l:x2 - (EX)2
N
N-l
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1987·1988 1988-1989
EX 412.3 zy 413.1 EX = 413.1 rf = 410.3
(EX)z =169991.29 {EY)z =170651.61 (EX)z =170651.61 (EY)z =168346.09
EX! = 34046.19 zyl = 34183.21 EXI = 34183.21 rfz = 33730.35
rxv = 34114.08 .9901 rxv = 33951.93 .9656
1987·1989 1988-1990
EX 412.3 zy = 410.3 EX 413.1 rf = 373.8
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1987·1990 1989-1990
EX = 412.3 zy 373.8 Z)( = 410.3 rf 373.8
(EX) I =169991.29 (EY)! =139726.44 (EX)! =168346.09 (EY)z =139726.41
EX' = 34046.19 %VI = 28281.0 Z)(! = 33730.35 rfl. = 28281.0
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